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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-EFFECT OF TIME LAPSE ON MANUFAC-
TURERS' DUTY-Plaintiff suffered injuries when the fly wheel on a truck he 
was driving gave way, causing the truck to crash. He brought an action 
in damages against defendant, manufacturer of the truck, alleging de-
fective design and manufacture of the fly wheel. The truck had been 
safely used for at least five years prior to the accident and had been driven 
200,000 to 400,000 miles during that period. On defendant's motion for 
directed verdict, held, granted. There is no evidence whatever that the 
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. Also, use of the truck for five 
years results in a conclusive denial that the truck involved an unreasonable 
risk of bodily harm when delivered by defendant. Solomon v. White Motor 
Company, (W.D. Pa. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 917. 
The lapse of time between manufacture of an article and an accident 
is always an important factor to be considered on the questions of negli-
gence of a manufacturer,1 proximate cause,2 and the applicability of res 
ipsa loquitur.s The validity of the court's statement, in the principal 
1 Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J. Super. 295, 97 A. (2d) 699 (1953); 
Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. (2d) 228, 201 P. (2d) 1 (1948). 
2 "\Vear and tear caused by use and the elements over a long period may be an in-
tervening cause. International Derrick &: Equipment Co. v. Croix, (5th Cir. 1957) 241 F. 
(2d) 216; Fredericks v. American Export Lines, (2d Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 450, cert. den. 
350 U.S. 989; Hale v. Depaoli, note 1 supra. 
s Oklahoma Tire &: Supply Co. v. Williams, (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 675; Reed &: 
Barton Corp. v. Maas, (1st Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 359. 
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case, however, that the use of a chattel for a long period of time results 
in a conclusive denial that the article was "imminently dangerous" or 
involved an "unreasonable risk" of bodily harm, may be open to some 
doubt. This proposition that passage of time will insulate a manufacturer 
is not of recent origin. It was at least strongly suggested by Judge Cardozo 
in his famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company4 extending 
liability of manufacturers beyond privity of contract. In the period between 
that holding in 1916 and the mid-1940's a number of decisions purported 
to terminate a manufacturer's duty because the passage of time established 
the article as not "imminently dangerous."5 A closer examination of these 
cases, however, makes it clear that the time element was seldom, if ever, 
the controlling factor. In several of them, as in the principal case, the 
court found no evidence of a lack of reasonable care by the defendant.6 
Where this is true, any statement as to the effect of time is superfluous 
and cannot be deemed indicative of the court's conclusion if faced with 
a showing of negligence. In others, especially the older cases, it is clear 
that the articles in question were of such a character that the court was 
not willing to include them within the "imminently dangerous" category 
absent the time factor.7 Therefore, the courts' observations as to the im-
portance of time lapse can hardly be viewed as more than a make-weight 
argument. It is possible that in a few cases the courts decided for the 
defendant in situations involving an otherwise "imminently dangerous" 
article and negligent conduct on the defendant's part.8 Even in these few 
cases, however, it is far from definite that the court actually found a lack 
of due care. Therefore, in spite of the broad language used in some of 
these earlier cases, it seems that the passage of time has never been an 
established defense for the negligent manufacturer. But regardless of 
4217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
5 See Miller v. Davis &: Averill, 137 N.J. L. 671, 61 A. (2d) 253 (1948); Schindley v. 
Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., (6th Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 102; Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 
42 Del. 149, 29 A. (2d) 145 (1942); Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., (W.D. Okla. 1936) 
17 F. Supp. 615; Lynch v. International Harvester Co., (10th Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 223; 
Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, (7th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 18; Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 
203 Ky. 408, 262 S.W. 583 (1924); Field v. Empire Case Goods Co., 179 App. Div. 253, 166 
N.Y.S. 509 (1917). But see Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, note 3 supra; Lill v. Murphy 
Door Bed Co. of Chicago, 290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N.E. (2d) 714 (1937). Both these latter cases 
allowed plaintiff to recover despite a long time lapse. 
6 Miller v. Davis & Averill, note 5 supra (crane pulled loose from ceiling rail); 
Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., note 5 supra (car brakes allegedly locked); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Wolber, note 5 supra (tractor tipped over backwards). 
7 Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., note 5 supra; Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 
note 5 supra (porch swing); Field v. ·Empire Case Goods Co., note 5 supra (wooden bed). 
s Schindley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., note 5 supra (stopping device on fire gate 
failed to catch). It is not certain that the court would ever have included the fire gate 
within the category of "imminently dangerous" articles. Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 
note 5 supra (diesel engine exploded after 16 months and three owners); Lynch v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., note 5 supra (covering over revolving cylinder on threshing 
m_achine used for five years gave way when plaintiff stepped on it). 
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what the state of the law may once have been, cases in recent years strongly 
indicate a doctrine that time alone can protect a manufacturer is not 
the law today. With the exception of the principal decision, there are 
apparently no cases within the last decade expressing such a doctrine. 
Conversely during that period there have been a number of direct holdings 
that the passage of time is not a factor in determining the "imminently" 
or "unreasonably" dangerous character of an article and is immaterial 
when negligence is proved.9 There are several possible reasons for the 
non-acceptance or gradual deterioration of the concept of passage of time 
as an insulative factor. Since 1916, the kind of articles included within 
the "imminently dangerous" category has been greatly expanded,10 not 
only leaving little room for the use of time lapse as a make-weight but 
probably pushing the entire concept of manufacturer's liability closer to 
a straight negligence analysis, in which time is immaterial except as it bears 
on foreseeability. Some courts have gone so far as to declare that all 
articles are now things of danger and that ordinary negligence rules are 
applicable.11 Equally significant is <the evolution of the language used in 
expressing the MacPherson rule. In that case, Cardozo used the phrases 
"imminently dangerous" and "reasonably certain to cause bodily harm" 
interchangeably. The initial tendency of the courts was to· express the 
rule as covering "imminently dangerous" articles.12 This language carries 
a strong connotation of immediacy. In more recent years, however, the 
courts have shifted toward the use of "reasonably certain"13 or similar 
expressions, such as the Restatement's "unreasonable risk."14 While these 
phrases are intended to express the same rule, they do not display the 
same characteristic of imminency and tend to de-emphasize time as a 
factor. It seems safe to conclude that the value of passage of time as an 
insulative factor was always conjectural. The principal case to the con-
trary, it is doubtful if it has any value today. 
John Paul Williams 
9 International Derrick &: Equipment Co. v. Croix, note 2 supra; Hewitt v. General 
Tire and Rubber Company, 3 Utah (2d) 354, 284 P. (2d) 471 (1955); Fredericks v. Ameri-
can Export Lines, note 2 supra; Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E. (2d) 491 
(1954); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., note 1 supra; Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 
344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E. (2d) 405 (1951). 
10 See James, "Products Liability," 34 TEX. L. REv. 44 (1955); 164 A. L. R. 559 (1946). 
11 Carter v. Yardley &: Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. (2d) 693 (1946); 164 A. L. R. 559 
(1946). 
12 Reed &: Barton Corp. v. Maas, note 3 supra; Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 
note 5 supra; Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., note 5 supra. 
13 Hale v. Depaoli, note 1 supra. 
14 2 TORTS REsTATEMENT §365 (1934). See James, "Products Liability," 34 TEX. L. 
REv. 44 (1955). 
